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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
VS. 
MARIELA UYOMBE ASHBURN, 
Defendant/Appellant 
:ase No: 900386 CA 
Priority Classification: 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon this 
Court by Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, which gives the Utah Court of Appeals appellate 
jurisdiction over appeals from district courts involving 
divorce, property division and support. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
!• Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding 
Defendant alimony in the amount of only $40 0 per month which was 
to terminate nine months later? 
2. Should the duration of an alimony award depend upon 
the length of the marriage? 
3. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in requiring 
Defendant to pay her own medical insurance premiums beginning 
August 1, 1990? 
For all three issues, the standard of review is as follows: 
1 
The trial court's factual findings are presumed correct 
and, unless they are shown to be "clearly erroneous" under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a) , they will not be set aside on 
appeal. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, a trial court's conclusions of law are examined for 
correctness and are accorded no special deference on review. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5- (1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties . . . 
Section 30-3-5- (3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties, . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final 
judgment of a decree of divorce and related relief, and 
specifically, from the adequacy of the alimony award. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint seeking a divorce from Defendant in Weber County 
District Court on April 19, 1989. Defendant filed an Answer on 
August 14, 1989, a Counterclaim on August 22, 1989 and issued a 
Request for Production of Documents. Plaintiff issued 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on 
August 18, 1989 and filed a Reply on August 25, 1990. A pre-
trial was held on November 13, 1989. Defendant's counsel 
withdrew on November 24, 1989 after filing an Objection to the 
Commissioner's Recommendations. On November 27, 1990, 
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Defendant's new counsel filed an Objection to Pre-Trial 
Recommendations and the matter was set for trial on March 27, 
1990 before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. The Decree of Divorce 
was entered on May 17, 1990 awarding Defendant $400.00 per month 
alimony terminating on December 31, 1990 and medical insurance 
coverage through Plaintiff's employer, terminating on.July 31, 
1990. 
4. Statement of Facts. The parties married in Las Vegas 
in September, 1985, after living together for approximately one 
year (Tr., at 73). No children were born of the six year 
relationship and Defendant obtained a Decree of Separate 
Maintenance on July 29, 1987, awarding her $400.00 per month for 
three years and requiring Plaintiff to maintain her on his 
employer's health, accident, and dental insurance plan, pursuant 
to the provisions of the federal statute, COBRA (Tr.,at 14, 23-
27 & 120). However, the parties never separated, they remained 
together while Defendant pursued an education (Tr., at 22-23). 
At the time of trial, Defendant was a 41 year old native of 
Equatorial Guinea, Africa, who first came to this country 27 
years ago at the age of about 14 years (Tr., at 16 & 78). This 
was the third marriage for Defendant who has two grown children 
from her first marriage and has worked very little outside the 
home, the last time being approximately fifteen years ago (Tr., 
at 15, 75 Sc 81) . Defendant has a fourth grade education in her 
native language, Spanish, is illiterate in English, and has a 
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very difficult time being understood when she speaks English 
(Tr., at 77-80). 
Defendant has always been totally dependant on others for 
support: First married at age 14 and divorced 15 years later 
(Tr., at 95-96), she totally relied on her husbands for support, 
then her son after her second divorce (Tr., at 75-81). During 
her marriages, Defendant did not work because her husbands 
required her to stay at home (Tr., at 81). When she did briefly 
work, Defendant worked as a domestic and also as a mail opener 
(Tr., at 80-81). 
Defendant has taught herself much of what she needs to know 
to get along by memorizing words and numbers and by learning how 
to take tests (Tr., at 80; Tr. Exhibit 2D). So far she has used 
her ability to memorize very well in progressing toward her goal 
of obtaining literacy in the English language by earning a high 
school diploma and taking a English language course at Weber 
State College (Tr., at 15 & 79). At Weber State College, 
Defendant, who spoke Pidgin English, could not keep up with the 
class (Tr., at 79). Plaintiff, a Computer Scientist, is well 
educated, having a Master's Degree from Hampton University (Tr., 
at 15 & 17). 
Prior to her relationship with and marriage to Plaintiff, 
Defendant lived with her daughter in Utah, then her son in 
California in a condo given to them by Defendant's first husband 
(Tr., at 75). Three days before she married Plaintiff, 
Defendant quit-claimed her share of this condo to her son and 
daughter because Plaintiff did not want to be responsible for 
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payments (Tr., at 19, 83, 97-100 ). At that time, Defendant 
also owned a car, a lot in the California desert and personal 
clothing and jewelry (Tr., at 83,91-92). 
Defendant entered into the marriage with Plaintiff on the 
basis of representations made by him which induced her to marry, 
namely that he would support her, care for her, and send her to 
school in the same way that her son was going to do (Tr., at 
76). Even though she loved him, Defendant did not want to marry 
Plaintiff because she thought he would become ashamed of her 
because of her lack of education (Tr., at 75). She explained to 
Plaintiff that she had always wanted to go to school to gain 
something for herself because her first two husbands wanted her 
to be a housewife (Tr., at 75-76). Plaintiff, convincing her 
that he would take care of her desires and needs, traveled to 
California to bring her to Utah, stopping in Las Vegas to marry 
(Tr., at 43 & 76). While not exactly denying that he promised 
her these things - "I said to her . . . whatever she asked me to 
say," he does admit that he encouraged her to go to school (Tr., 
at 44). 
During her relationship with Plaintiff, Defendant suffered 
emotional and physical turmoil. Six weeks after the marriage, 
Defendant discovered that the representations concerning the 
marriage would and could never be fulfilled because plaintiff 
admitted to her that he was a homosexual and that he had had a 
relationship with another man (Tr., at 77). Even though both 
parties have tested negatively for AIDS, defendant lives in fear 
that a later test will reveal that she has indeed contacted the 
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disease (Tr., at 54, & 89 -90). In addition, physical problems 
acquired during the marriage prevent her from employment similar 
to which she undertook fifteen years ago (Tr., at 81). She has 
injuries to her arm, head and chest as a result of physical 
abuse inflicted on her by Plaintiff which causes her much pain 
and a continuing need for medical care (Tr., at 49 & 81-82). 
Defendant has gone to the Women's Crises Center in Ogden for 
help (Tr., at 82) and subsequent counseling by a social worker 
employed by the State of Utah, Social Service Administration as 
a direct result of the physical abuse inflicted by Plaintiff 
(Tr., at 32 and 69-70). Even though Plaintiff has denied that 
he caused her injuries, he has admitted hitting her (Tr., at 
32). Also, he has stated that another time, while they were 
arguing, she somehow "backed up and fell" when he turned around 
to face her (Tr., at 62). In addition to the physical abuse, 
Defendant endured the last of her four abortions during her 
relationship with Plaintiff, at his direction, one year before 
the trial, a further indication of the emotional turmoil she 
encountered (Tr., at 85 and 88). 
At the time of trial, Plaintiff earned $41,000 per year 
with an annual Civil Service Retirement benefit accumulating at 
the rate of $1,800 - 2,000 per year (Tr., at 17, 56 and 58; Tr. 
Exhibit 3D). After considering the payments of support pursuant 
to the Decree of Separate Maintenance, the trial court granted 
defendant alimony in the amount of $400.00 per month terminating 
on December 31, 1990, only nine months later (Tr., at 120; 
Decree of Divorce #4, R., at 60). The trial court also ordered 
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Plaintiff to maintain and to pay for Defendant's medical 
insurance coverage through July 31, 1990, when Defendant should 
be responsible for the payment of such coverage (Decree of 
Divorce #4, R., at 60). This order was entered despite 
Defendant's testimony that she had no medical insurance (Tr., at 
55 and 88). The trial court awarded Plaintiff all the assets of 
the marriage including all of his retirement benefits, (Decree 
of Divorce, #6, R., at 60), and any equity which would have 
accumulated in the parties' home in Ogden during the six year 
relationship (Tr., at 120). While it is true that Plaintiff was 
ordered to pay the car payments for Defendant's car, (Decree of 
Divorce, #3, R., at 59-60), the record shows that the court 
intended this to be an offset against her share of his 
retirement (Tr. at 120-121). The trial court even awarded 
Defendant her property in California despite her testimony that 
she no longer had an interest in such property (Decree of 
Divorce, #2, R., at 59; Tr., at 91). 
Defendant presently receives a total income of $200 per 
month (Tr., at 92 and 93). Her son is no longer able or willing 
to support her or to pay for her schooling because he has other 
obligations (Tr., at 105 and 106). Defendant no longer owns the 
jewelry she had before the marriage because she sold it during 
the marriage (Tr., at 91). In the past Defendant has had to 
depend on friends for emotional and physical support and it is 
submitted that she continues to temporarily depend on these 
friends while resisting public assistance (Tr., at 105 - 107). 
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When looking at her history, it becomes apparent that 
Defendant never had the opportunity to develop the necessary 
marketable job skills and, even Plaintiff agrees, the only 
skills she is qualified to do involve physical labor or factory 
work (Tr., at 44 & 77-81). Defendant's inability to use the 
English language effectively to communicate is also a serious 
barrier. Further complicating the situation is the fact that 
Defendant is disabled due to injuries she received due to 
Plaintiff's abuse during the parties' marriage (Tr., at 49 , 63, 
81-82, and 104). Defendant desires to attend school in order to 
obtain the necessary skills to become employable and independent 
(Tr., at 106-107). In order to do this she will continue to 
need support and medical coverage from Plaintiff. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
Defendant alimony in the amount of only $400.00 per month and 
for only nine months, in light of the following factors: (1) 
the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income 
for herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support. The trial court abused its discretion in this 
case by not considering all three of the above factors nor did 
it make adequate factual findings on material issues relating to 
the issue of alimony. Even if the trial court somehow 
considered the above three factors, the award of alimony is such 
a serious inequity that it becomes a clear abuse of discretion. 
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Factors considered are what physical or mental disabilities 
arising during the marriage, regardless of their cause, have 
increased the need for alimony or have reduced a spouse's 
ability to produce income. Courts consider whether a spouse can 
be returned to the status she had before marriage or if it is 
likely that she could become a public charge. If the record is 
inadequate, the case can be remanded back to the trial court for 
further factual findings on material issues. 
2. The duration of an alimony award should not depend 
solely upon the length of the marriage but rather on what 
changes occurred in a party's economic situation during the 
marriage. The court should consider such factors as what 
economic adjustments were made which resulted in Defendant's 
dependence and whether she can be returned to the status she had 
before the marriage. Trial courts retain the ability to 
determine whether the alimony award has served its purpose. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion in not 
considering Defendant's medical needs in awarding her alimony 
and by requiring Plaintiff to maintain and to pay for her 
medical insurance coverage only through July 31, 1990. It is 
important to consider the alimony award only after properly 
distributing the property interests to the respective parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ONLY $400.00 PER MONTH ALIMONY, 
AND FOR ONLY NINE MONTHS. 
A trial court's award of alimony is committed to the sound 
discretion of that court, and it will not be disturbed absent a 
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clear abuse of discretion. Haumont v. Hauirtont, 793 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah App. 1990) . In setting an award of alimony, the trial 
court must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition 
and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for herself, and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Id. The trial court is also required to make adequate factual 
findings on all material issues when considering these factors. 
Id. If the trial court considers the above described factors in 
setting an award of alimony, the award will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id. If the trial court 
fails to consider the three factors or fails to make adequate 
factual findings on all material issues, the case will be 
remanded to the trial court for the proper considerations unless 
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable 
of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. Id. 
Analyzed in light of the above requirements, the trial 
court abused its discretion in this case by not considering all 
three of the above factors and by not making adequate factual 
findings on material issues relating to the issue of alimony. 
Also, the relevant facts are unclear, controverted and do not 
support a finding in favor of the judgment. Even if this Court 
finds that the trial court somehow considered all of the above 
three factors and made the required findings on material issues, 
the award of alimony is such a serious inequity that it becomes 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
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1. The Financial Conditions and Needs of the Receiving 
Spouse, 
Several Utah cases have addressed this first factor as an 
important function of an alimony award and have held that there 
must be adequate factual findings concerning the financial 
condition and needs of the receiving spouse. In Rusham V. 
Rusham, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1987), the trial court failed to 
adequately address the financial needs of the receiving spouse. 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court made inadequate 
findings on the financial needs of the wife and abused its 
discretion in awarding her only $600 per month alimony when 
nothing in the record delineated her financial needs despite her 
monthly expenses of $1,521.50. id. The trial court found that 
the wife was capable of earning $200.00 per month while her 
husband's earnings were found to be $5,850.00. The Supreme Court 
held that, while equalization of income was not necessarily the 
requirement, there must be some clear rationale for the level of 
alimony consistent with the stated criteria. Id. at 126. 
There are no factual findings concerning the financial 
condition and needs of Mrs. Ashburn in the present case - only 
that she has "tremendous need" (Tr., at 120). As in Rusham, the 
trial court here denied extended alimony based upon the short 
term of the marriage in spite of her "tremendous need." There 
is no evidence in the record that the court's rationale for 
awarding her $400.00 per month for only nine months was 
consistent with her financial needs as mandated by Rusham. The 
evidence in the record, in fact, strongly suggests the contrary. 
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Defendant now receives a total of $20 0.00 per month income. 
(Tr., at 93). While no evidence was presented at trial on her 
expenses, it is obvious she will have difficulty supporting 
herself. The fact she remained living with Plaintiff after 
going to the trouble of obtaining a Decree of Separate 
Maintenance is proof of that (Tr., at 23). 
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a permanent alimony award of $750.00 per 
month to help meet the needs of the wife despite the fact that 
the parties' marriage was only three years in duration. The 
court, in examining the financial condition and needs of the 
wife, found that the disabilities Defendant suffered as a result 
of her injuries at Plaintiff's hand should be an important 
consideration in assessing the first two of the three factors. 
The court also found that the wife may have suffered permanent 
injuries that left her unemployable or unable to work at her 
past level of experience and held that it was appropriate for 
the trial court to take into account whether physical or mental 
disabilities arising during the marriage, regardless of their 
cause, have made the receiving party's needs greater or reduced 
that party's ability to produce an income. Noble at 1372. The 
facts in the Noble case involved the extreme case where the 
husband attempted to murder his wife and to commit suicide and 
failed in both. However, the significance and importance of the 
court's holding is that the duration of a marriage should not be 
considered at all when the receiving party's ability to earn a 
living has been reduced during the marriage, for whatever 
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reason. Defendant has testified that her ability to handle work 
requiring physical labor has been greatly impaired due to the 
injuries in her her arm, elbow, head and chest (Tr., at 81-82). 
Plaintiff even agrees that she has these injuries and that she 
has sought medical help (Tr., at 49). Defendant has also 
testified that she has sought medical help for these injuries 
but there are no findings by the trial court that she is 
disabled, that she is illiterate, or that she, in fact, could 
work. The relevant facts concerning her disability are either 
lacking completely or they are unclear and controverted and they 
do not support a finding in favor of the judgment. 
Bovle v. Bovle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah App. 1987), 
addresses the issue of alimony in a second marriage. The trial 
court awarded no alimony after a seven-year marriage and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed its decision because the decree entered 
by the trial court restored each party to the condition which 
existed at the time of the marriage. Id. at 671. The Court, 
looking at the issue of whether the trial court's award can place 
a spouse back into the position occupied prior to the marriage, 
held that the wife could support herself. This was found 
impossible in Noble. 
In the present case, Defendant cannot be returned to the 
position occupied prior to the marriage. Defendant is disabled 
due to the injuries she sustained during the marriage. While the 
evidence regarding her disability is controverted, a review of 
the testimony of both parties leaves no doubt that she sustained 
injuries during the marriage and was in a better position before 
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marriage then she is in now. Before marrying Plaintiff, she had 
the support from her son and his intention to educate her, but 
she no longer can depend upon this support (Tr., at 105-106). In 
addition, Defendant owned land in the California Mojave desert 
and an interest in a condominium in California which she does not 
have now (Tr., at 90-91). Even though Defendant was awarded her 
car and her personal clothing (Tr., at 91), she has suffered 
economic losses. Because her car was destroyed by Plaintiff in 
an accident, (Tr., at 83-84), the court, by requiring Plaintiff 
to make payments on a new one, simply restored her separate 
property to her. But she paid dearly for this for the court 
considered the car payments an offset against Plaintiff's 
retirement. Even though Defendant was not working when she 
married Plaintiff, nor did she work during the marriage, 
Plaintiff knew of her background, her lack of ability to 
communicate and her illiteracy (Tr., at 73-74). But he convinced 
her to marry him, anyway, with Defendant believing that he would 
educate her and care for her. 
2. The Ability of the Wife to Produce a Sufficient Income 
for Herself. 
The trial court in the present case made no findings on 
Mrs. Ashburn's ability to produce a sufficient income to support 
herself, nor do the relevant facts support such a finding. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the denial of 
alimony was a clear abuse of discretion where the record does 
not reveal that the court considered or made any finding of the 
wife's current or future ability to work. Canning v. Canning, 
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744 P.2d 325, 32.6 (Utah App. 1987). In Canning, the Court held 
that the decree, while appearing to contemplate that the wife 
would obtain work and earn income sufficient to support herself 
and the parties' children, there were no specific factual 
findings to that effect. Id. at 327. Without specific factual 
findings, she would be left without a baseline for future 
modification purposes if she does not in fact obtain ongoing, 
income-producing work. Id. 
In Hialev v. Hialev, 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983), the Court 
examined the economic situation facing the parties, particularly 
women emerging from a marriage who earn approximately 60 percent 
of what men earn. Because the trial court made no findings 
regarding the receiving spouses' ability to work in the present 
as well as in the future and, because of health problems that 
appeared to greatly restrict her ability to work, the Supreme 
Court held that an award of $100 per month permanent alimony was 
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Hiqlev at 381. 
The appellant in Hiqlev was a 47 year old woman with a high 
school education who was in poor health and who had spent most 
of the last 3 0 years of her life as a full-time homemaker and 
caretaker of her children. Id at 381. The court found that 
Appellant could well be forced to resort to public assistance as 
the trial court's award of $100 per month alimony fell far short 
of serving her needs. 
Likewise, in the instant case, Defendant has spent nearly 
all of her life as a full-time homemaker and caretaker of her 
children at the consent and requirement of her husbands. She 
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only worked for a short time and is now left with only $200.00 
per month income, an inability to communicate in the English 
language, and with a physical disability. This could force her 
to seek public assistance as her income falls far short of 
meeting her needs. Defendant cannot be expected to rely on any 
assets acquired during the marriage because she has none of 
these, not even a fair share of Plaintiff's retirement. 
Courts have awarded alimony when it was found that the wife 
could be forced to seek public assistance. In English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court held 
that the most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent her from 
becoming a public charge. The trial court observed in Sampinos 
v. Samioinos, 750 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah App. 1988): ". . . The 
trial court's allocation of alimony was an attempt to keep 
plaintiff from becoming a public charge and to realign the 
disparity between the defendant's and plaintiff's standards of 
living." In Sampinos, the Court of Appeals held that alimony 
should be paid based on the needs of the wife and her ability to 
produce income for herself. 
Thus, the alimony award of $400.00 per month, in the 
present case, constituted an abuse of discretion. It was 
inequitable and unfair, also, as to its short duration. There 
were no specific factual findings as to whether Defendant could 
or would obtain work and earn income sufficient to support 
herself or if she could become a public charge. The evidence 
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shows that she did not work prior to the marriage or during the 
marriage because Plaintiff did not want, nor expected her to 
work. There was no evidence presented that Defendant would have 
a job when the alimony terminated or that she could be self-
supporting at that time only, apparently, the trial court's 
assumption. As noted in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567.(Utah 
1985) : 
. . . Having worked only minor clerical jobs for two 
brief periods over twenty years apart she has no 
reasonable expectation of obtaining employment two 
years hence that will enable her to support herself 
at a standard of living even approaching that which 
she had during the marriage. Continuing spousal 
maintenance is mandated by these circumstances . . 
should the circumstances change in the future, the 
defendant may petition the court to modify the 
decree under its continuing jurisdiction. 
3. The Ability of the Husband to Provide Support. The 
trial court recognized that Plaintiff has the ability to pay 
alimony. Plaintiff has a yearly income of $41,000 in addition 
to retirement and savings. Plaintiff offered no evidence of his 
monthly expenses except the car payments (Tr., at 20). Further, 
Plaintiff offered no evidence of the effect on his standard of 
living of his paying $400.00 per month to Defendant. Thus, the 
trial court failed to adequately consider this third factor in 
its award of alimony. 
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If the Record is adequate, this Court can modify the Decree 
of Divorce or, if the record is not adequate, remand the case 
back to the trial court for further findings and a resetting of 
the alimony award based upon the required findings. Haumont, 
supra. In Haumont, the Court of Appeals found that there was 
substantial converted evidence as to the required three factors 
which did not lend itself to a finding only in favor of the 
judgment. Id. 
A review of the record in the present case suggests that 
the trial court clearly abused its discretion by not making 
adequate factual findings on material issues relating to 
appellant's need for continuing support. Also, the relevant 
facts are unclear and controverted and do not support the 
judgment which result in a serious inequity. It is submitted 
that much of this problem had to do with Defendant's lack of 
ability to communicate to the court and to her counsel. 
Defendant's desperate attempt to submit relevant evidence to the 
court for reconsideration can be seen in her post trial filings 
as recorded in the Index to the Record. 
It is also important to consider that Plaintiff told 
Defendant he would provide for her, never asked her to get a job 
during their marriage and completely supported her even after 
the Decree of Separate Maintenance was in effect. Defendant 
took Plaintiff at his word, that he would provide adequate 
support for her while she went to school. It is submitted that 
the trial court ignored the real dynamics of the parties' 
relationship, to-wit: that Plaintiff, by his actions, lulled 
18 
Defendant into a false sense of security and then, when he filed 
for the divorce before she had a chance to complete her 
education, he pulled the rug out from under her. 
POINT TWO: THE DURATION OF AN ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD 
NOT DEPEND UPON THE LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE 
In English v. English, supra, the findings of the trial 
court as to its award of $2,000 per month alimony, as well as 
$500 child support, was based upon the parties' twenty year 
marriage and joint financial contributions. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that basing an award of alimony on the length of the 
marriage as well as the financial contributions was not an 
appropriate measure to determine alimony. Id. Likewise, in the 
present case, the trial court clearly denied Mrs. Ashburn 
extended alimony due to the length of the marriage despite her 
tremendous need for it. 
The trial court retains continuing jurisdiction in order to 
terminate alimony under the provisions of Section 30-3--5 (3) of 
the Utah Code which provides in part: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties . . . as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 759 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals held that it was not 
appropriate to have alimony terminate on completion of education 
or attainment of full-time employment but the matter should be 
returned to the trial court to reconsider the alimony award in 
19 
light of the completed education or full-time employment 
commensurate to the three factors. (See Haumont, supra.) 
Thus, trial courts retain the ability to determine whether 
or not the alimony award has served its purpose. If the award 
is rehabilitative in nature, it can be brought back to the Court 
for further review in appropriate circumstances. 
Lest Plaintiff point out that in many previous Utah 
appellate decisions awarding permanent alimony such as Hialev v. 
Hiqlev, supra; Olson v. Olson, supra; and Canning v. Canning, 
supra; the marriages were of eighteen years duration or longer, 
Defendant notes this Court's approval of permanent alimony 
awards in short term marriages: Noble v. Noble, supra, 
(permanent alimony award after a three year marriage); Haumont 
v. Haumont. supra, ( separation less than three years after 
marriage, permanent alimony award given); Sampinos v. Sampinos, 
supra, ( Permanent alimony award after an eleven year marriage 
where the parties had separated four times for a total period of 
more than four years) . Even though in Boyl^ e, supra, at 671, the 
Court held that consideration of the three factors does not 
preclude considering factors such as the length of the marriage 
in awarding alimony, the Boyle case can be distinguished from 
the present one by its facts. In Boyle, the trial court 
properly considered the three necessary factors and the material 
facts clearly supported the evidence where the wife was awarded 
most of the marital estate as well as the residue of her 
premarital assets. Boyle, supra, at 671. Also, it was found 
20 
that the wife was able to continue to work as she had done prior 
to the marriage. Id. at 672. 
In the present case, Defendant was awarded no assets of the 
marriage, she had lost pre-marital assets, she did not work 
prior to the marriage and her disability prevents her from 
working at her only level of experience. Also, the trial court 
found that the marriage was over at the time of the Separate 
Maintenance Decree and, therefore, it took into account the 
amount paid to her under this Decree in awarding alimony even 
though the parties were living together during that time. This 
resulted in a serious inequity and is an abuse of discretion. 
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S NEED FOR 
MEDICAL INSURANCE IN CONSIDERING THE 
ALIMONY AWARD. 
Injuries and attendant medical expenses may be considered 
in determining an appropriate alimony award. In Walther v. 
Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court held 
that the trial court's award of $5,000 for pain, suffering, and 
future medical expenses caused by the physical abuse of the 
wife's husband could be considered in awarding alimony. Id. 
In the present case, there was no finding by the trial 
court that Defendant could pay for her medical needs or for 
insurance coverage nor did the award of alimony allow for these 
needs. There was only Defendant's testimony that she had 
incurred medical expenses and will have future medical expenses. 
It is appropriate for the trial court to consider the 
amount of alimony only after it properly distributes property 
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interests to the respective parties. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 
1166, N.3 (Utah App. 1990). In the present case, the trial 
court considered the amount paid to Defendant under the Decree 
of Separate Maintenance in awarding the marital assets even 
though the marriage was intact during that time. It also 
considered the amount of the car payment of $237.73 per month 
until November, 1992 to be an offset against Plaintiff's 
retirement even though it was Plaintiff that wrecked the car 
(Tr., at 120-121). For these reasons the resulting award was 
such a serious inequity that it is a clear abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant respectfully 
prays that this Court modify the amount and duration of the 
alimony award to permanent alimony, as argued above, and award 
Defendant attorney fees incurred on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Af day of February, 1991. 
CAROLYN D. ZEt^EH3Tl20 
Attorney for AptellatLU/^efendant 
2485 Grant AvenUe, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered by hand four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant,, on this 
'fust day of February, 1991 to: C. Gerald Parker, Attorney for 





30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1); tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
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C. Gerald Parker, #2520 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P. 0. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN, 
826 North Liberty Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
SS No. 223-78-4987 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIELA UYOMBE ASHBURN, 
Post Office Box 5128 
Carson, California 90749 
SS No. 331-36-6900 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 890902015DA 
Judge: Stanton M. Taylor 
MAY 9 1990 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on 
the 27th day of March, 1990, before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting 
without a jury. The plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant 
appeared in person a^ id was represented by her counsel, Phillip D. 
Judd. The Court fieard the evidence introduced on behalf of both 
Indexed 
plaintiff and defendant, and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, pursuant to which a decree is to be entered; 
now by virtue of the law and premises, in accordance with the facts 
found and conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the plaintiff and defendant be, and they are 
hereby, dissolved and the parties be, and they are hereby, restored 
to the status of unmarried persons on the date the divorce decree 
is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in the Register of 
Actions. 
2. That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets 
he or she owned prior to the marriage, free and clear of any claim 
by the other. Pursuant to this provision, plaintiff is therefore 
awarded his home in Ogden, Utah, and defendant is awarded her real 
estate situated in the State of California. Plaintiff's home in 
Ogden, Utah now stands of record in the names of ALBERT P. ASHBURN 
and MARIELA U. ASHBURN and the legal description thereof is as 
follows: 
All of Lot 248, RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 3, Ogden 
City, Weber County, Utah. 
3. That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets 
now in his or her possession. Pursuant to this provision, 
defendant is awarded the 1987 Honda Accord automobile and in 
- 2-
Record-ad ^ ° ^ 4 5 . | 
Indexed 
accordance with plaintiff's stated willingness to pay for this 
vehicle, he is ordered to pay the balance owing thereon. Plaintiff 
also is ordered to pay the taxes and insurance on said vehicle 
until the balance owing on said vehicle has been paid in full, at 
which time he shall no longer be responsible to pay the taxes and 
insurance thereon. 
4. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to continue to pay 
the property settlement of $400.00 per month set forth in the 
Separate Maintenance Decree through the month of July, 1990 and 
commencing with the month of August, 1990, plaintiff is hereby 
ordered to pay to defendant the sum of $400.00 per month as and for 
alimony, to continue through December 31, 1990, at which time said 
alimony shall terminate. 
5. That through the month of July, 1990, defendant shall 
have the right to maintain medical insurance coverage through 
plaintiff's insurer, pursuant to the provisions of the federal 
COBRA statute, with plaintiff to pay the premiums thereon for that 
period. Should defendant elect to extend the said COBRA coverage 
beyond July 31, 1990, she shall be responsible to pay all of the 
premiums from that point forward. 
6. That plaintiff is hereby awarded all of his 
retirement benefits and defendant is hereby awarded the $200.00 per 
month retirement benefits she is receiving, pursuant to a former 
marriage. 
Recordedpfiofck^l * X _ | 
X Page 
Indexed 
. * . " : 
7. That defendant is hereby awarded judgment against 
plaintiff for attorney's fees in the sum of $600.00. 
8. That defendant is hereby restored to her former 
surname of MUNSON. ^ 
DATED this H day of ApriJL 1990. 
St£nt 
District 
Approved as to fojnua^d content 
P h i l l i p D. JucUT 
Atrtorney—feir^ef endant 
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:. Gerald Parker, #2520 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P. 0. Box 107 
Jgden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
\LBERT PHAREZ ASHBURN. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs . ) 
) Civil No. 890902015DA 
'lARIELA UYOMBE ASHBURN, ) 
) Judge: Stanton M. Taylor 
Defendant. ) 
MAY 9 1990 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on 
:he 27th day of March, 1990, before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting 
without a jury; the plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant 
ippeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Phillip D. 
Judd. The Court heard the evidence introduced on behalf of both 
plaintiff and defendant, and after being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of 
Weber County, Utah, and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were married to each 
other at Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 14, 1985, and ever since 
said time have been and now are husband and wife. 
3. That no children have been born of this marriage and 
none are expected. Defendant has two adult children by a prior 
marriage. 
4. That on July 29, 1987, a Decree of Separate 
Maintenance was granted between the parties by the above-entitled 
Court under Case No. 99795, which decree provided inter alia for 
disposition of assets of the parties, the maintenance of medical 
insurance, and the awarding to defendant of the sum of $400.00 per 
month as a property settlement to continue for a period of three 
years, commencing with the month of August, 1987. 
5. That the parties have irreconcilable differences 
making further marital relationship impossible. 
6. That the parties have acquired assets, including the 
following: 
(a) A home which plaintiff owned prior to the 
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During the marriage, defendant's name was added to the 
property and the home now stands of record in the names of 
Albert P. and Marieia U. Ashburn. The legal description 
of said home is as follows: 
All of Lot 248, RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 3? Ogden City, 
Weber County, Utah. 
(b) Certain real property owned by defendant 
situated in the State of California. 
(c) A 1987 Honda Accord automobile. 
(d) Household furniture, furnishings and 
effects . 
(e) Retirement benefits accrued by defendant 
through his employment at Hill Air Force Base and a 
retirement benefit in the sum of $200.00 per month which 
defendant receives pursuant to a prior marriage. 
(f) Personal effects. 
7. That plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force 
Base wich an income of approximately $41,000.00 per year 
gross and a net income of approximately $2,200.00 per 
month. 
8. That defendant was not employed at the time 
of her marriage to plaintiff and she has not been employed 
since that time. 
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represented by legal counsel in these proceedings and each 
has incurred attorney's fees herein. 
10. That prior to this marriage, defendant was 
known by the surname of MUNSON, by which surname she 
desires to be known in the future. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court arrives at 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce 
from the defendant, the same to become final on the date the 
divorce decree is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in 
the Register of Actions. 
2. That each of the parties is hereby awarded the assets 
he or she owned prior to the marriage, free and clear of any claim 
by the other. Pursuant to this provision, plaintiff is therefore 
awarded his home in Ogden, Utah, and defendant is awarded her real 
estate situated in the State of California. 
3. That each of the parties be awarded the assets now in 
his or her possession. Pursuant to this provision, defendant is 
awarded the 1987 Honda Accord automobile and in accordance with 
plaintiff's stated willingness to pay for this vehicle, he is 
ordered to pay the balance owing thereon. Plaintiff also is 
ordered to pay the taxes and insurance on said vehicle until the 
- 4 -
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balance owing on said vehicle has been paid in full, at which time 
he shall no longer be responsible to pay the taxes and insurance 
thereon. 
4. That plaintiff be required to continue to pay the 
property settlement of $400.00 per month set forth in the 
previously referenced Separate Maintenance Decree through the month 
of July, 1990 and commencing with the month of August, 1990, 
plaintiff shall be required to pay to defendant the sum of $400.00 
per month as and for alimony, to continue through December 31, 
1990, at which time said alimony shall terminate. 
5. That through the month of July, 1990, defendant shall 
have the right to maintain medical insurance coverage through 
plaintiff's insurer, pursuant to the provisions of the federal 
COBRA statute, with plaintiff to pay the premiums thereon for that 
period. Should defendant elect to extend the said COBRA coverage 
beyond July 31, 1990, she shall be responsible to pay all of the 
premiums from that point forward. 
6. That plaintiff be awarded all of his retirement 
benefits and defendant be awarded the $200.00 per month retirement 
benefits she is receiving, pursuant to a former marriage. 
7. That defendant be awarded the sum of $600.00 toward 
her attorney's fees in lieu of the $400.00 previously recommended 
by the Court Commissioner and judgment should be awarded to 
- 5 -
defendant for said attorney's fees. 
8. That defendant be restored to her former surname of 
MUNSON. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this T day of A^eilV 1990. 
Approved as to form and content: 
Stan£ot/M. Ti 
District Jud 
Phillip D. J u d ^ 
Attorney fov^vefendant 
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